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THE  EURO  CRISIS  AND  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  
DISORDER  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION*  
  
Sergio  Fabbrini**       Abstract  
  The   Lisbon   Treaty   is   the   outcome   of   several   constitutional   compromises.   The   compromise  between   the   supranational   and   the   intergovernmental   views   of   the   European   Union   (EU),   the  compromise  between  the  member  states  engaged  in  building  a  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  and  those  allowed  to  opt-­‐out  from  it  and  the  compromise,  within  the  EMU,  between  a  centralized  approach   to   monetary   policy   and   decentralized   economic,   fiscal   and   budgetary   policies,  constrained  however  within  the  formalized  rules  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (SGP).  The  euro  crisis   has   called   into   question   this   multiple      constitutional   setting.   The   balance   between  supranational  and  intergovernmental  views  has  been  upset  in  favour  of  the  former.  The  approval  of  new  intergovernmental  treaties  has  made  crystal  clear  the  separation  of  interests  between  the  EMU   and   the   opt-­‐out   member   states   (the   United   Kingdom   in   specific).   The   inefficacy   of   the  voluntary  coordination  between  national  governments  in  dealing  with  the  euro  crisis  has  brought  to  an  unprecedented  centralization  and  judicialization  in  the  governance  of  the  common  currency.  In  the  constitutional  disorder  induced  by  the  euro  crisis  the  EU  has  assumed  specific  institutional,  legal  and  ideological  configurations.        
1. Introduction    
  The  euro  crisis  has  radically  called  into  question  the  constitutional  system  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  as  formalized  by  and  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty  (entered  into  force  on  1  December  2009).  The  EU  constitutional  system  was  based  on  a  plurality  of  compromises.  First,   the  compromise  between  a  supranational  union  (in  charge  of  single  market’s  policies)  and  an  intergovernmental  union  (in  charge  of  the  policies  traditionally  closed  to  national  sovereignty,  as  the  economic  and  financial   policy   and   the   foreign   and   security   policy).   Second,   the   compromise   between   the  member   states   constituting   the   Economic   and  Monetary   Union   or   EMU   (that   is   the   member  states   adopting   the   single   currency,   the   euro,   or   engaged   in   meeting   the   macro-­‐economic  criteria  for  adopting  it,  the  ‘pre-­‐ins’)  and  member  states  retaining  their  own  national  currency  (because  allowed  to  opt-­‐out  from  EMU,  the  so-­‐called  ‘outs’).  Third,  the  compromise,  within  the  euro-­‐area,   between   the   centralization   of   monetary   policy   by   a   supranational   institution   (the  European  Central  Bank  or  ECB)  and  the  decentralization  of  economic,  fiscal  and  budgetary  poli-­‐      
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cies   in   the   member   states,   subject   to   the   voluntary   coordination   of   their   governments   but  constrained  by  specific  macro-­‐economic  legalized  rules.    These   compromises   were   based   on   different   rationales.   The   first   was   an   institutional  compromise  finalized  to  define  the  basic  regime’s  rules  for  dealing  and  solving  collective  problems.  Through  this  compromise  it  was  attempted  to  recompose  two  alternative  views  of  political  union,  one   stressing   its   supranational  and   the  other   its   intergovernmental   character.  The  second  was  a  
political  compromise  derived  by   the  necessity   to  accommodate  different  views  on  economic  and  monetary  integration,  at  their  turn  expression  of  different  views  of  national  sovereignty,  consisting  in  letting  few  (but  crucial)  member  states  (as  the  United  Kingdom  or  UK)  not  to  be  part  of  the  EMU.  The  third  was  an  economic  compromise  based  on  the  necessity  to  conciliate  contrasting  economic  principles,   as   the   centralization   of   monetary   policy   in   the   ECB   and   the   decentralization   of  economic,   fiscal   and  budgetary  policies   in   the  member   states   of   the   euro-­‐area.   It  was   this   latter  compromise   to   reflect   the   economic   constitution’s   theory   of  German   ordo-­‐liberalism.   In   fact,   the  compromise   consisted,   on   one   side,   in   recognizing   national   discretion   in   economic,   fiscal   and  budgetary   policies   and,   on   the   other   side,   in   delimiting   national   discretion   through   a   pre-­‐established   legal   framework   ordering   the   management   of   those   discrete   policies.   The   Lisbon  Treaty   is   the   outcome   of   these   multiple   constitutional   compromises.   It   has   formalized   a   dual  constitutional   regime,   expression   of   two   different   political   views   of   the   Union;   it   has  accommodated  a  separation  of  interests  between  EMU  countries  and  the  economic  and  monetary  regimes  of  other  EU  member  states;  it  has  combined  centralization  and  voluntarism  within  EMU.    For   meeting   the   challenges   posed   by   financial   markets’   speculation,   the   EU   has   approved   a  panoply  of  new  legislatives  measures  through  the  procedures  established  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  but  a  number  of  EU  member  states  has  also  approved  new  intergovernmental  treaties  (the  European  Stability   Mechanism   or   ESM   and   the   Treaty   on   Stability,   Coordination   and   Governance   in   the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  the  so-­‐called  Fiscal  Compact)  outside  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  besides  executive  agreements  (as  the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  or  EFSF  and  the  Euro  Plus  Pact)  binding   only   the   signatory   member   states.   In   addition   to   the   already   established  intergovernmental  treaties,  a  new  one  is  going  to  be  approved  in  the  context  of  the  making  of  the  banking   union:   the   intergovernmental   agreement   for   constituting   the   Single   Resolution   Fund  (SRF),  the  financial  engine  of  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  (SRM).  These  legislative  measures,  intergovernmental  treaties  and  special  purpose’s  agreements  have  upset  the  multi-­‐layer  structure  of   constitutional   compromises   institutionalized   by   the   Lisbon   Treaty.   Within   the   ensued  constitutional   disorder,   specific   institutional,   legal   and   ideological   configurations   have   emerged  within  the  EU.    The   paper   aims   to   identify   those   configurations.   For   doing   that,   I   will   proceed   as   follows.   In  section   2,   I   will   discuss   the   first   compromise   between   two   different   political   interpretations  (supranational  and  intergovernmental)  of  the  EU  emerged  definitively  with  the  Maastricht  Treaty  of   1992.   In   section   3,   I   will   discuss   the   second   compromise   between   the   EMU   member   states  (favoring   a   deeper   integration   in   crucial   policy’s   areas)   and   the   member   states   that   decide   to  remain  outside  of  EMU.  In  section  4,  I  will  discuss  the  compromise  within  the  euro-­‐area  between  monetary  policy’s  centralization  and  decentralization  in  economic,  fiscal  and  budgetary  policies.  In  section  5,  I  will  analyze  the  impact  of  the  euro  crisis  on  the  multi-­‐layer  structure  of  constitutional  compromises,  showing  how  it  has  altered  them.  In  section  6,  I  will  identify  the  main  contours  of  the  new   institutional,   legal   and   ideological   configurations   emerging  within   and   outside   the   EU.   The  Conclusion  will  finally  bring  home  the  arguments  of  the  paper.      
3 
 
2. The  institutional  compromise  
  The  Maastricht  Treaty  (1992)  officially  established  that  the  economic  and  financial  policy  of   the   EU   would   be   defined   and   regulated   within   a   decision-­‐making   regime   that   was  intergovernmental   in   nature.   The   Maastricht   Treaty   was   necessarily   conditioned   by   the  historical  context  within  which  it  was  negotiated  and  then  signed  by  the  member  states  on  7  February  1992.  Organized  after   the  end  of   the  Cold  War,   the   intergovernmental   conference  held   in  Maastricht   in   1991   had   inevitably   to   deal   with   issues   unconnected  with   the   single  market  (Baun  1995-­‐96).  At  that  conference,   it  was  accepted  to  bring  those  issues  within  the  integration   process,   but   on   the   condition   that   they   should   be   strictly   controlled   by   the  member   states’   governments.   Indeed,   the   Treaty   introduced   an   institutional   differentiation  that   promoted   different   decision-­‐making   methods   for   dealing   with   different   policy   areas.  Three  distinct  pillars  were  created,  organized  according  to  different  decision-­‐making  regimes.    The  homogeneous  character  of  the  supranational  entity  which  emerged  from  the  previous  decades  was   altered   through   the   formation  of   different   institutional   settings  but   yet  within  the  same  legal  order.  Indeed,  since  the  Rome  Treaties  of  1957,  the  Union  developed  through  the  so-­‐called   ‘Community  method’   (Dehousse  2011)  based  on  the   idea   that  decision-­‐making  power   has   to   be   shared   between   supranational   institutions   (as   the   Commission   -­‐   with   its  monopoly  of   legislative  initiative  -­‐  and  later  the  European  Parliament  or  EP  -­‐  become  a  true  co-­‐decisional  legislature)  and  the  intergovernmental  institutions  (represented  by  the  Council  of   Ministers   or   Council   -­‐   the   other   co-­‐decisional   legislature   -­‐   and   the   informal   European  Council  of  the  heads  of  state  and  government).  In  this  method,  the  European  Council  was  not  considered  to  play  an  active  role  in  the  policy-­‐making  process.  Rather  it  was  considered  a  sort  of   court   of   last   resort,   the   institution   in   charge   of   solving   the   ‘intractable   issues’   emerging  from  the  integration  process.  For  managing  the  common  and  then  single  market  policies,  the  policy-­‐making   process   came   to   be   structured   around   a   triangular   institutional   framework  with   the   Commission   as   the   executive   institution   (protected   by   its  monopoly   of   legislative  initiative   from   member   states’   influence)   and   the   Council   and   the   EP   as   the   bicameral  legislature.   The   European   Council   was   (considered   to   be)   one   of   the   Council’s   formations  (Naurin  and  Wallace  2008),  rather  than  an  institution  on  its  own  right.    At  the  intergovernmental  conference,  this  (old)  supranational  union  was  not  considered  to  be  the  solution  for  dealing  with  the  policies  emerging  with  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  because  it  did   not   recognize   a   sufficiently   central   role   to   national   governments.   For   this   reason,   the  member   states   choose   an   alternative   constitutional  model   of   integration   for   governing   the  policies   traditionally   closed   to   national   sovereignty.   Those   policies   were   Europeanized   but  kept   under   the   control   of   the   collectivity   of   national   governments   (as   represented   by   the  Council  and  the  European  Council,  with  limited  involvement  of  the  supranational  institutions  as  the  Commission  and  EP).  It  was  also  established  that,   in  those  policies,   integration  would  have   to  proceed   through  voluntary   acts  by  national   governments.  Because   in   those  policies  integration  could  not  take  place  through  law,  then  the  role  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  or  ECJ   (whose   power   was   crucial   for   constituting   the   supranational   constitution)   came   to   be  necessarily   curtailed.   The   two   constitutional   models   (the   old   supranational   and   the   new  intergovernmental),  then  formalized  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  reflected  two  different  views  on  how   to   manage   a   political   union   in   Europe   (Laursen   and   Vanhoonocker   1992).   The   two  constitutional   models   consisted   in   two   distinct   decision-­‐making   regimes,   a   coexistence  considered  necessary  for  advancing  the  political  integration  of  the  continent.  
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This  compromise  was  accepted  by  many  supra-­‐nationalists  on  the  teleological  assumption  that  the  intergovernmental  constitution  would  have  been  re-­‐absorbed  sooner  or  later  by  the  supranational  one  ‘because  of  the  logic  of  things’.  The  Constitutional  Treaty  (CT),  elaborated  by  the  Brussels  Convention  in  2002-­‐2003  and  thus  signed  by  the  member  states  governments  in  Rome  in  2004,  seemed  to  confirm  that  assumption.  Although  the  CT  preserved  the  double  constitution  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  it  nevertheless  created  the  momentum  that  would  have  plausibly   brought   to   the   supranational   overhauling   of   the   EU.   The   defeat   of   the   CT   in   the  popular   referendums   held   in   France   and   in   the   Netherlands   in   2005   interrupted   the   old  supranational  narrative,   legitimizing  on   the  contrary   the  alternative  new   intergovernmental  narrative.   The   2009   Lisbon   Treaty   abolished   the   pillars’   structure   formalized   in   the  Maastricht   Treaty,   but   it   kept   distinct   the   two   different   decision-­‐making   regimes.   In   the  management  of  public  policies   linked  to   the   internal  market,   the  Lisbon  Treaty  prescribes  a  model   of   supranational   federation  where   the   decision-­‐making   power   is   shared  by  multiple  institutions.   Although   it   formally   recognized   for   the   first   time   the   European   Council   as   an  executive   organ   inserted   in   the   Union’s   institutional   system,   such   a   constitution   was  considered  to  sustain  a  system  of  government  still  characterized  by  the  interplay  among  the  three  policy-­‐making  institutions  substantiating  the  Community  method  (the  Commission,  the  Council   and   the  EP).  At   the   same   time,   for  policies   that  have   traditionally  been   sensitive   to  national  sovereignty  (in  our  case,  economic,  fiscal  and  budgetary  policies),  the  Lisbon  Treaty  prescribes  a  model  of  intergovernmental  constitution  with  characteristics  similar  to  a  sort  of  ‘federalism  of  governments’.  Such  a  constitution  sustains  and  justifies  a  system  of  governance,  rather  than  a  system  of  government,  characterized  by  the  pooling  of  decision-­‐making  power  in  the   institutions,   the  European  Council  and  the  Council,   representing  the  governments  of   the  Union  (on  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  see  Craig  2010  and  Piris  2010).  Indeed,  when  the  Lisbon  Treaty  was  first  conceived  (2007)  and  then  approved  (2009),  the  European  Council’s  executive  role  was  viewed  as  necessary   in   these  policies,  not   in   those  connected   to   the   single  market   that  was  considered  a  reserved  domain  for  the  exercise  of  the  executive  role  of  the  Commission.  When  the  financial  crisis  arrived  to  Europe,   in  coincidence  with  the  entering  into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  not  only  there  was  in  place  an  intergovernmental  constitution  for  dealing  with   it,   but   there  was   also   a   general   consensus   that   only   national   governments   could   find  solutions  for  the  financial  turmoil.  Since  2010,  it  has  come  to  be  believed  that  economic  and  monetary  integration  can  develop  only  if  controlled  or  governed  by  the  national  governments  represented   in   the   European   Council   by   their   leaders   (coordinated   by   the   now   permanent  president  of   that   institution)  and   in   the  Council  by   their   functional  ministers  (the  Economic  and  Financial  or  ECOFIN  Council  in  particular).  It  was  not  a  surprise  to  hear  the  former  French  President  Nicholas  Sarkozy  saying  in  his  speech  in  Toulon  on  1  December  2011:  “the  reform  of  Europe   is  not  a  march   towards  supra-­‐nationality.   (…)  The  crisis  has  pushed   the  heads  of  state   and   government   to   assume   greater   responsibility   because   ultimately   they   have   the  democratic   legitimacy   to   take   decisions.   (…)   The   integration   of   Europe   will   go   the  intergovernmental  way  because  Europe  needs  to  make  strategic  political  choices.”    
  
3.  The  political  compromise    After   having   accepted   the   re-­‐unification   of   Germany   in   1990   and   in   order   to   keep   the  reunified  Germany  within  a  tighter  framework,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  set  also  the  criteria  for  launching  an  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (or  EMU)  (Martin  and  Ross  2004).  EMU  consisted  in  a  set  of  rules  aimed  at  converging  the  economic  policies  of  all  the  EU  member  states  thus  
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creating   the   condition   for   the   adoption  and   functioning  of   a   single   currency,   to  become   the  currency   of   the   Union   (Jabko   2006).   Certainly   the   single   currency   project   was   not   thrown  together   in   the   aftermath   of   the   German   reunification   (Issing   2008).   Indeed,   it  was   largely  defined  by  a  1988  ad  hoc  committee,  chaired  by  the  then  president  of  the  Commission  Jacques  Delors   and   constituted   by   the   governors   of   the   central   banks   of   the   then   twelve   member  states.   Already   in   the   1970s,   after   the   collapse   of   the   Bretton  Woods   currencies   exchange  system,  projects   and  proposals   for  promoting   a  European  monetary   system  were   advanced  and  discussed.  The  Delors  Report  of  1988  was  a  solution  in  search  for  a  problem.  The  problem  arrived  with  the  necessity  to  envelop  a  reunified  Germany  in  a  stronger  European  framework.  Through  the  launch  of  the  single  currency  project,   it  was  assumed  that  a  reunified  Germany  would  continue  to  be  a  European  Germany.  Germany,  in  fact,  was  asked  to  give  up  the  symbol  of   its   own   post-­‐war   economic   resurgence,   the   Deutsche   Mark,   in   order   to   be   allowed   to  achieve  the  political  end  of  that  resurgence.    The  Maastricht  Treaty  set  out  a  plan  to  introduce  EMU  in  three  stages.  On  1  January  1994  a  European  Monetary  Institute  was  established  as  the  forerunner  of  a  new  banking  institution  for   controlling  monetary  policy.  On  1   June  1998,   this  new   institution,   the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB),  was  created,  tailored  on  the  model  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank.  On  31  December  1998  the  conversion  rates  between  the  eleven  participating  national  currencies  and  the  euro  were  established.  On  1  January  2002,  the  euro  notes  and  coins  started  to  circulate.  The  EMU  was   not  merely   a   policy’s   project.   Since   its   inception   it   had   a   political,   not   only   economic,  rationale   (Dyson   and   Quaglia   2010).   In   fact,   it   was   based   on   the   compromise   between   the  United  Kingdom  (UK)  and  Denmark,  on  one  side,  and  the  other  member  states,  on  the  other.  Although  celebrated  as  the  economic  and  monetary  regime  for  all  the  EU  member  states,  UK  and  Denmark  were   allowed   to   formally   opt-­‐out   from   the   obligation   to   convert   the  national  currency   into   the   new   single   currency,   regardless   of   their   macro-­‐economic   conditions.   De  
facto,   a   third  member   state,   Sweden,   has   been   allowed   to   keep   its   own   national   currency,  thanks   to   a  biased  algebraic   calculation   regularly   showing   its   inability   to   fulfil   the   required  macro-­‐economic  criteria.  The  three  countries  contributed  with  others  in  the  1960s  to  develop  a  project  of  economic  cooperation,   the  European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA)1  at   its   turn  heir  of  the  Free  Trade  Area  (FTA),  alternative  to  the  project  of  economic  integration  started  with   the   1952   Paris   Treaty   and   the   1957   Rome   Treaties.   Indeed,   Denmark,   after   having  rejected  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  a  popular  referendum  hold  in  1992,  came  finally  to  accept  it  through   a  new   referendum  hold  on  1993  because  of   the   so   called  Edinburgh  Agreement   of  December   1992   which   allowed   the   country   to   opt-­‐out   from   the   need   to   adopt      the   future  single  currency.    The  Maastricht   Treaty  was   a   turning   point   also   symbolically.   The   semantic   change   from  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  to  European  Union  (as  Treaty  of  the  European  Union  or   TEU),   although   inclusive   of   the   Rome   Treaty   now   called   Treaty   on   the   European  Community  (TEC  regulating  single  market  policies),  signalled  the  deepening  of  the  integration  process.  For  accepting  this  qualitative  leap  of  the  latter,  the  member  states  still  supporting  the  
                                                
1 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was created in 1960 by seven countries as a looser alternative to the then 
European Economic Community (EEC). It was the heir of the Free Trade Area (FTA), a project pursued by the UK between 
1956-58. The EFTA as a trade bloc was established by the Stockholm Convention held on 4 January 1960 in the Swedish 
capital. The founding members of EFTA were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  
During the 1960s these countries were often referred to as the Outer Seven, as opposed to the Inner Six of the then-EEC. Most 
of its membership has since joined the EEC, then EU. At the end of 2012, EFTA was constituted by four countries: Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.  
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vision   of   the   EU   as   an   economic   community  were   thus   allowed   to   opt-­‐out   from   the   most  integrationist  policies.   It  need  to  be  said  that  the  view  of  the  EU  as  an  economic  community  should  not  be  confused  with   that  of   the  EU  as  an  economic  union.   In   the  EU,   the  concept  of  economic   union   emerged   in   connection  with   that   of  monetary   union,   both   institutionalized  with   the   EMU.   On   the   contrary,   by   economic   community   the   ex-­‐EFTA   countries  meant   the  organization   of   the   common   market.   If   one   assumes,   with   Balassa   (1961),   that   regional  economic   integration   advances   through   four   basic   stages   (free   trade   area,   customs   union,  common   market   and   economic   union),   then   the   concept   of   economic   community   can   be  located   between   the   second   and   the   third   phase,   quite   far   from   the   fourth   stage.   The   opt-­‐clause  was   the   price   to   be   paid   for   preventing   the   ex-­‐EFTA   countries   from   obstructing   the  extension  of  the  integration’s  process  to  policies  traditionally  closed  to  national  sovereignty.  The  opting  out  from  undesired  legislation  or  treaty  provisions  gave  those  member  states  the  right   both   not   to   participate   in   specific   policy   areas   and   not   to   be   subject   to   a   general  jurisdiction  in  it.    The  opting-­‐out  compromise  has  accompanied  the  process  of  integration  from  Maastricht  to  Lisbon  and  later.  In  addition  to  Denmark  and  UK  opting  out  from  adopting  the  euro,  Protocol  No.  30  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  asserts  (Art.  1)  that  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  “does  not  extend   the   ability   of   the   Court   of   Justice   of   the   European   Union…to   find   that   the   laws,  regulations   or   administrative   provisions,   practices   or   action   of   Poland   or   of   the   UK   are  inconsistent   with   the   fundamental   rights,   freedoms   and   principles   that   it   reaffirms”.   The  Czech   Republic   has   joined   the   two  member   states   in   opting   out   from   the   Charter  with   the  2013  Treaty  on  the  accession  of  Croatia.  Regarding  legislation,  Denmark,  Ireland  and  UK  have  opted  out  from  policy  regulation  of  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice.  Ireland  and  the  UK  have  opted  out  from  the  Schengen  agreement  on  the  free  circulation  of  persons  within  the  Union2.  Denmark  has  opted  out   from   foreign   and   security  policies.  At   the   end  of   2013,   five  member   states   had   such   opt-­‐outs:  Denmark   (four   opt-­‐outs),   Ireland   (two   opt-­‐outs),   Poland  (one  opt-­‐out),  Sweden  (one  opt-­‐out,  but  only  de  facto)  and  the  UK  (four  opt-­‐outs),  the  Czech  Republic  (one  opt-­‐out  ratified  with  the  2013  Treaty  on  the  accession  of  Croatia).  The  opting-­‐out  from  adoption  of  the  euro,  however,  had  a  special  character:   it   formalized  the   existence   of   different   economic   constitutions.   Notwithstanding   what   the   Lisbon   Treaty  (TEU,  Art.  3.4)  re-­‐asserted,  namely  that  “the  Union  shall  establish  an  economic  and  monetary  union  whose  currency  is  the  euro”  or  better  that  the  euro  is  not  an  option  but  a  requirement,  UK  and  Denmark  were   left   free  of   keeping   their  national   currency.   Formally,   Lisbon  Treaty  (TFEU,  Art  139.1)   recognizes   this  possibility  only   to   those  member  states   that  do  not   “fulfil  the  necessary   conditions   for   the  adoption  of   the  euro   (and   for   this   reason   they,  n.d.r.)   shall  hereinafter   be   referred   to   as   ‘Member   States  with   derogation’”,   or   ‘pre-­‐ins’  member   states.    
                                                
2 The Schengen Agreement is a Treaty signed on 14 June 1985 in the town of Schengen in Luxembourg, by five of the 
then nine member states of the EU (then called the EEC). It was supplemented by the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement five years later. The Agreement, Convention and rules were implemented in March 1995. 
Together these treaties created Europe's borderless Schengen area, which operates as a single area for international 
travel with external border controls for those travelling in and out of it, but with no or minimal internal border controls. 
The Schengen Agreements and the rules adopted under it were, for the EU members of the Agreement, entirely separate 
from the EU legal order until the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which incorporated them into the EU law. The borderless 
area created by the Schengen Agreements, at the end of 2012, consisted of 25 EU member states (Ireland and the UK 
having opted out to remain outside), In addition, four non-EU member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland) are members of the borderless area, and three European micro-states (Monaco, San Marino, and the 




This  has  never  been   the  case   for  Denmark  and  UK.  Thus,  within   the  EU,  different  economic  and  monetary  regimes  came  to  coexist.  Within  the  EMU,  the  regime  of  the  euro-­‐area  member  states  (the  ‘ins’)  and  the  regimes  of  those  member  states  not  yet  fulfilling  the  macro-­‐economic  criteria   but   engaged   in   meeting   them   (the   ‘pre-­‐ins’).   Outside   the   EMU,   the   monetary   and  economic  regime  of  the  member  states  self-­‐excluded  from  the  common  currency  (the  ‘outs’).  The   Lisbon   Treaty   has   thus   institutionalized   in   the   same   institutional   and   legal   framework  diverging   economic   and   monetary   interests,   in   the   assumption   that   they   would   converge  towards  a  shared  goal  of  economic  growth  and  monetary  stability.  
  
4.  The  economic  compromise    There   is   a   third   compromise   to   consider,   this   time   concerning   the   euro-­‐area   member  states.   This   compromise   consisted   in   combining   centralization   (of   monetary   policy)   with  decentralization   (of   the   economic,   budgetary   and   fiscal   policies   connected   to   the   single  currency),   a   combination   that   should   however   operate   within   pre-­‐defined   economic  parameters   endowed   of   a   legal   status.   The  monetary   policy   of   the   single   currency  was   put  under   the   control   of   a   supranational   institution,   the   ECB,   but   the   other   connected   policies  remained  in  member  states’  hands.  Once  it  was  accepted  to  set  up  a  road  map  for  achieving  the   single   currency,   it   was   adopted,   for   the  monetary   side   of   EMU,   the   German  model   of   a  strictly   independent   central   bank   pursuing   a   monetary   policy   exclusively   anti-­‐inflationary  and,  for  the  economic  side  of  EMU,  the  intergovernmental  model  based  on  voluntary  policies’  coordination  by  member  states’  governments.  At  the  core  of   this  compromise  there  was  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (Heipertz  and  Verdun  2010),  constituted  by  a  Resolution  and  two  Council   Regulations.   The   first   regulation   "on   the   strengthening   of   the   surveillance   of  budgetary   positions   and   the   surveillance   and   coordination   of   economic   policies",   known   as  the  preventive  arm,  entered  into  force  on  1  July  1998  and  the  second  regulation  "on  speeding  up   and   clarifying   the   implementation   of   the   excessive   deficit   procedure",   known   as   the  dissuasive  arm,  entered  into  force  on  1  January  1999.  The  SGP  at  its  turn  was  justified  by  Art.  104.14  of   the  Treaty  of  European  Community  (TEC),  part  of   the  Maastricht  Treaty,   that  “set  out   in   the   Protocol   on   the   excessive   deficit   procedure”   the   conditions   for   ordering   the  coordination  of  national  economic  policies.  The  Protocol,  thus  become  Protocol  No.  12  of  the  Lisbon   Treaty,   establishes   as   reference   value:   3%   for   the   ratio   of   the   planned   or   actual  government   deficit   to   gross   domestic   product   at   market   prices   and   60%   for   the   ratio   of  government   debt   to   gross   domestic   product   at   market   prices.   The   SGP   and   the   Excessive  Deficit  Procedure  (EDP)  Protocol  epitomized  the  German  ordo-­‐liberal  idea  (elaborated  in  the  1930s  by  the  Friburg  School,  Young  2012)  of  an  economic  constitution  structured  around  pre-­‐established  (and  not  negotiable)  legal  rules.      Thus,  although  the  member  states  can  pursue  their  own  policies,  they  were  expected  to  do  that   within   budgetary   parameters   (defining   the   ratio   of   public   deficit   and   debt   to   GDP),  formalized   as   proper   statutory   rules.   However,   although   expected   to   be   respected,   those  statutory  rules   showed  not   to  be  sufficiently  binding.   Indeed,   in  2003,  Germany  and  France  did  not  keep  their  budgetary  parameters  (in  particular  the  one  regarding  the  deficit)  within  the   prescribed   limits.   In   this   case,   TEC,   Art.   104.5   prescribed   that   “If   the   Commission  considers   that   an   excessive   deficit   in   a  Member   State   exists   or  may   occur,   the   Commission  shall   address  an  opinion   to   the  Council”.   Indeed,   the  Commission   submitted  a   report   to   the  ECOFIN  Council,  proposing  of  opening  the  EDP  for  the  two  member  states.  However,    TEC,  Art.  104.6  added  also  that  “The  Council  shall,  acting  by  a  qualified  majority  on  a  recommendation  
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from   the   Commission,   and   having   considered   any   observations   which   the   Member   State  concerned  may  wish  to  make,  decide  after  an  overall  assessment  whether  an  excessive  deficit  exists”.  And  the  Council  voted  against  the  Commission’s  proposal  to  open  an  EDP  against  both  Germany  and  France.  Under  the  pressures  of  the  small  member  states,  the  Commission  thus  appealed  the  ECJ  against  the  Council’s  decision.  In  July  2004,  the  ECJ  declared  that  the  ECOFIN  Council  was   indeed   authorized   by   the   TEC   to   hold   the   EDP   in   abeyance   by   not   adopting   a  Commission’s   recommendation   to   start   a   EDP.   It   thus   became   clear   that   the   SGP,   although  appeared   to   be   a   celebration   of   rules   and   quasi-­‐automatic   procedures,   could   not   challenge  national  discretion,   in  particular   that  of   the   larger  member   states.  The  ECJ  decision  did  not  settle  the  problem.  Immediately  afterword,  the  Commission  and  the  member  states  started  a  process  of  revision  of  the  legal  texts  of  the  SGP,  that  is  of  the  economic  constitution  of  EMU.  This   process  was   concluded   in  March   2005   through   strengthening   of   the   SGP’s   procedural  rules,  with  a   clarification  of   the  EDP  and   the   imposition  of   common  rules  on   the  making  of  national   fiscal  policies.  However,   “the   legal  nature  of   the  Pact  was  not  substantially  altered”  (Heipertz  and  Verdun  2010:  2).    As   Joerges   (2013:9)   stresses,   “EMU  was  understood  as   a  political  project,   albeit   one   that  was  to  be  shielded  strictly  from  the  influence  of  daily  politics,  and  entrusted  to  the  medium  of  law  instead,  and  a  strictly  politically  independent  institution”,  thus  adding  that  this  “economic  constitution   with   the   material   and   institutional   substitution   of   legal   rules   for   politics  was…nothing   less   than   a   sine   qua   non   for   German   participation   within   EMU”.   The   policy-­‐making   model   emerged   from   the   economic   constitution   of   EMU   has   been   subsequently  conceptualized   by   several   scholars   (Heritier   and  Rhodes   2010;   Kohler-­‐Koch   and  Rittberger  2006;   Caporaso   and  Wittenbrinck   2006)   as   new  modes   of   governance   and   it   included   the  open  method   of   coordination,   benchmarking,  mainstreaming,   peer   review.   These  modes   of  governance   function   through   the   voluntary   coordination   between   the   governments,  coordination  thus  regulated  by  macro-­‐economic  rules  that  only  the  national  governments  can  decide  (as  a  collective   in   the     ECOFIN  Council)  whether   they  are  respected  or  not  by  one  of  them.   Thus,   on   one   side,   there   was   the   formalization   of   parameters   within   which   policy’s  coordination  should  develop,  on   the  other  side   there  was   the  recognition   that  only  national  governments  could  decide  (coordinating  in  Brussels’   intergovernmental   institutions)  how  to  deal   with   those   of   them   not   respecting   the   agreed   parameters.   No   direct   supranational  imposition   on   national   governments’   behaviour  was   envisaged   by   any   of   the   supranational  institutions  (the  Commission  and  ECJ  in  particular).  Through  the  voluntary  intergovernmental  coordination,   it   was   possible   to   keep   decentralized   the   economic,   fiscal   and   budgetary  policies,   preventing   the   formation   of   a   supranational   authority   and   the   allocation   of  supranational  resources  (as  an  autonomous  Union’s  budget  independent  from  member  states’  transfer   of   money)   for   managing   those   policies.   In   a   speech   given   on   2   November   20103,  Chancellor  Merkel   conceptualized   this   economic   constitution   as   follows:   “the  Lisbon  Treaty  has  placed  the  institutional  structure  (of  the  EU)  on  a  new  foundation”,  to  the  point  of  making  out-­‐dated  the  traditional  distinctions  between  “Community  and  intergovernmental  methods”.  Thus   adding   that   the   EU   is   already   functioning   according   to   a   “new  Union  method”,  which  consists  of  “coordinated  action  in  a  spirit  of  solidarity”.    In  short,  the  panoply  of  constitutional  compromises  was  the  price  to  be  paid  for  keeping  on  balance   different   institutional,   political   and   economic   interests   and   views   on   the   EU,   thus  preserving   the   unitary   character   of   the   integration’s   project.   The   role   of   the   various  
                                                
3 Opening ceremony of the 61th academic year of the College of Europe in Bruges. 
9 
 
compromises  was  to  accommodate  different  needs  and  perspectives,  on  the  assumption  they  would  not  become  reciprocally   incompatible.  The  systemic  condition  for  the  preservation  of  these  multiple  constitutional  balancing  acts  resided  in  the  equilibrium  between  the  interests  and  the  views  supporting  the  one  and  the  other  side  of  the  forces  stipulating  the  compromise.  Indeed,   from  Maastricht   to   Lisbon,   the  EU  developed   as   a   political   system   internally   highly  differentiated   (Dyson   and   Sepos   2010),   able   to   accommodate   member   states   interpreting  differently   the   integration  process  and   its   finality.  With   the  approval  of   the  Lisbon  Treaty   it  was   generally   thought   that   those   constitutional   compromises   would   finally   find   their  consolidation.  Facts  have  not  followed  expectations.  
  
5.  The  euro  crisis  and  the  constitutional  disorder  
  
5.1.  Implications  on  the  institutional  compromise  The   financial   crisis   –   which   impacted   on   the   EU   and   EMU   at   the   same   time   the   Lisbon  Treaty   entered   in   force–   has   upset   the   complex   structure   of   compromises   built   within   the  Treaty.   The   euro   crisis   has   dissolved   the   ambiguity   of   an   EU   based   on   the   coexistence   of  different   decision-­‐making   regimes;   it   has   called   into   question   the   coexistence   of   member  states   interested   only   in   organizing   economic   cooperation   within   a   common   market   and  member   states   moving   (or   obliged   to   move)   ‘towards   a   genuine   economic   and   monetary  union’  (as  per  the  title  of  the  Report  submitted  by  the  four  presidents  of  the  European  Council,  the  Commission,  the  Euro  Group,  the  European  Central  Bank  to  the  meeting  of  the  European  Council  on  5  December  2012)  as  a  step  for  achieving  a  more  effective  and  legitimate  economic  governance   of   EMU.   But   the   crisis   has   also   disrupted   the   coexistence   of   contradictory  principles  in  the  function  of  the  EMU,  as  voluntary  coordination  in  economic  policy  between  member   states   and   statutory   regulation   of   that   coordination   through   highly   formalized  macro-­‐economic  and  judicial  rules.  Let’s  consider  these  implications  at  the  level  of  the  three  compromises.  First,   the   euro   crisis   has   upset   the   equilibrium   between   the   supranational   and  intergovernmental  constitution.  As  provided  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  (Closa  2012),  the  European  Council  has  become  the   true  decision-­‐making  center   for   the  policies  adopted   in  response  to  the   financial   crisis.   Because   the   financial   agenda   has   engulfed   the   EU   policy-­‐making,   the  European   Council,   with   its   permanent   president,   has   become   the   true   decision-­‐maker   (De  Scoutheete  2011;  Eggermont  2012),  not  just  an  institution  limiting  itself  to  define  the  general  aims  of   the   integration  process.   In   those  strategic  policies  (and   in   the  EMU  specifically),   the  Commission  has  come  to  play  a  more  limited  executive  role,  transforming  and  implementing  the   policy’s   indications   of   the   European   Council   in   technical   proposals.  More   the   crisis   has  deepened   and  more   the  European  Council   has   extended   its  executive’s   role   to   other   crucial  policies  of  the  EU,  influencing  the  exercise  of  the  Commission’s  power  of  legislative  initiative.  If   it   is   true   that   the  Commission  was   the   exclusive  Union’s   executive  when   the  EU  policies’  centered  around  the  single  market  (Page  1997),  this  is  no  longer  the  case  with  the  shift  of  the  policies’  center-­‐stage  in  the  direction  of  euro  stability  and  economic  governance.  Of  course  the  Commission  has  not  become  irrelevant.  Indeed,  because  intergovernmental  coordination  has  not   been   able   to   overcome   fundamental   dilemmas   of   collective   actions   (as   the   veto,  enforcement,   compliance   and   legitimacy   dilemmas,   Fabbrini   S.   2013),   the   governmental  leaders  of  the  European  Council  have  had  to  resort  to  the  Commission  for  dealing  with  those  dilemmas.    
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Using   an   over-­‐simplified   picture   of   the   policy-­‐making   process   structured   around   three  basic   phases   (elaboration,   decision-­‐making   and   implementation),   one  might   argue   that   the  Commission  has  become   (in   the  EMU  policies)   the  exclusive  actor   in   the   third  phase,   it  has  played  a  minor  role  in  the  second,  and  it  has  lost  its  traditional  role  in  the  first  phase.  In  the  first  two  phases,  it  has  been  the  European  Council  (and  in  particular  the  meetings  of  heads  of  state  and  government  of  the  euro-­‐area  called  as  Euro  Summit  by  the  Fiscal  Compact)  to  have  played   the   crucial   role.   Moreover,   also   regarding   the   EP,   there   are   signs   of   a   significant  political  down-­‐sizing.   It   is   true   that  many   legislative  measures  were  adopted  through  either  the   ordinary   or   the   special   legislative   procedures   that   recognize   a   decision-­‐making   or  consultative  role  to  the  EP,  but  it  is  also  true  that  the  deepening  of  the  euro  crisis  has  led  to  new  treaties  that  do  not  recognize  the  EP  as  a  policy-­‐making  actor.  Certainly,  it  was  difficult  to  identify  a  role  for  the  EP  (which  represents  the  citizens  of  the  EU)  in  new  organizations  set  up  by  not  all  the  member  states  of  the  EU  (Hefftler  and  Wessels  2013).  In  short,  in  the  aftermath  of   the   financial   crisis,   a   re-­‐structuring   of   the   balance   between   the   supranational   and   the  intergovernmental  constitutional  regimes  in  favor  of  the  latter  has  taken  place.  With  the  euro  crisis,  the  decision-­‐making  barycenter  has  moved  towards  the  relation  between  the  European  Council  (and  the  Euro  Summit)  and  the  ECOFIN  Council  (and  the  Euro  Group  of  the  economic  and   financial   ministers   of   the   euro-­‐area   member   states),   rather   than   towards   the   relation  between  the  Commission  and  the  EP  (as  it  was  during  the  Delors’  years  of  building  the  single  market,  between  1985-­‐1994).  
  
5.2.  Implications  on  the  political  compromise  Also  the  compromise  between  the  UK  (and  more  in  general  the  ex-­‐EFTA  countries)  and  the  EMU  member  states  has  been  upset  by  the  euro  crisis.  The  two  new  Treaties  (ESM  and  Fiscal  Compact)   were   established   outside   the   legal   order   of   the   Lisbon   Treaty   because   of   the  difficulties   encountered  by   the   intergovernmental   constitution   in   solving   the   veto  dilemma.  The  objectives   that  were   set  out  under   those  Treaties   could  have  been  attained   through  an  amendment   to   the   Lisbon  Treaty   (or   even   through   secondary   EU   law).  However,   the   euro-­‐area  leaders  choose  to  resort  to  international  treaties  for  neutralizing  the  veto  threatened  by  the   UK   government.   Indeed,   for   preventing   future   veto’s   threats,   those   treaties   set   up   new  organizations  where  unanimity  is  no  longer  necessary  for  taking  decisions.    The   formation   of   new   legal   orders   outside   the   Lisbon  Treaty,   although  not   incompatible  with  the  latter  (De  Witte  2012),  calls  necessarily  into  question  the  constitutional  compromise  between   the   EMU   and   the   opt-­‐outs   member   states,   the   UK   in   particular.   With   the   Fiscal  Compact,   the   large  majority   of   the  member   states  will   come   to   coordinate   their   economic,  fiscal  and  budgetary  policies,   leaving  on   the  margin   the  only  UK  (the  Czech  Republic,  which  refused  to  sign  the  Treaty  in  2011,  is  now  reexamining  its  position).  Moreover,  the  UK  is  also  outside  of  the  Euro  Plus  Pact,  a  political  commitment  (a  sort  if  intergovernmental  agreement)  between   the   euro-­‐area  member   states   and   several   no   euro-­‐area  ones   (as  Denmark,  Poland,  Lithuania,  Bulgaria,  Romania  and  Latvia,  the  latter  thus  become  member  of  the  euro-­‐area  on  1  January   2014)   aimed   to   foster   stronger   economic   policy   coordination   between   them.  Certainly,  the  Fiscal  Compact  declares  (Art.  16)  that  “within  five  years  at  most  following  the  entry   into   force   of   this   Treaty,   on   the   basis   of   an   assessment   of   the   experience   with   its  implementation,   the   necessary   steps   shall   be   taken,   (…),  with   the   aim   of   incorporating   the  substance   of   this   Treaty   into   the   legal   framework   of   the   European   Union”,   as   it   already  happened  with  the  Schengen  Agreement.  The  assumption  being  that  the   integration  process  
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would   come   to   be   regulated   again   by   a   single   legal   framework,   with   functional   internal  differentiations  concerning  specific  policies.    However,   for   this   incorporation   to   take   place,   the   consent   of   UK   will   be   required.   An  unlikely  outcome,  given  that  the  Treaty’s  clauses  would  continue  to  affect  negatively  London’s  financial  district,  as  it  would  have  done  at  the  moment  of  its  opposition  to  the  Lisbon  Treaty’s  amendment.  Indeed,  the  UK  and  the  EMU  member  states  have  come  to  acknowledge  that  their  economic  and  monetary  interests  diverge.  The  view  of  the  EU  as  an  economic  community  has  shown  to  be  incompatible  with  the  need  to  govern  the  euro.  The  new  organization  set  up  by  the  Fiscal  Compact  has  made  evident  this  reality.  The  most  crucial  decisions  have  been  taken  in   the  meetings  of   the  governmental   leaders  of   the  member   states  adopting   the  euro   (Euro  Summit),  with  the  pre-­‐ins  and  the  outs  member  states  informed  only  later  about  their  content.  The  coexistence  of  interests  between  the  euro-­‐area  and  the  opt-­‐out  member  states  has  been  further   weakened   by   the   formation   of   a   banking   union   within   EMU,   as   a   set   of   rules   and  institutions   distinct   from   the   European   Banking   Authority   (EBA)   established   on   1   January  2011  with  the  mission  of   increasing  transparency   in   the   financial  system  of   the  EU  at   large.  Interesting   enough,   while   EBA  was   located   in   London,   the   new   institutions   of   the   banking  union  have  been  set  up  in  Frankfurt,  within  the  ECB  or  connected  with  it.  The  banking  union,  inaugurated   throughout   2013,   represented   the   preliminary   step   (through   the   separation   of  the  intermingling  of  national  banks  and  sovereign  debt)  for  creating  the  condition  of  a  stable  currency  area.  According  to  the  Report  by  the  four  presidents  of  5  December  2012,  a  banking  union   should   consist   of   a   Single   Supervisory   Mechanism   (SSM),   a   Single   Resolution  Mechanism  (SRM)  and  a  Deposit  Guarantee  Mechanism  (DGM).  The  same  Report  added  also  that   the   integrated   financial   framework   (the  banking  union)   should   thus  be   followed  by   an  integrated  budgetary   framework,   then  an   integrated  economic  policy   framework  and   finally  by   a   new   institutional   framework   able   to   guarantee   a   better   democratic   legitimacy   and  accountability  to  the  EMU.  Considering  the  banking  union’s  project,  it  should  be  notice  that  it  makes  no  references  to  EBA  and  its  regulatory  scope.  After  a  contrasted  debate,  the  European  Council  (and  the  Euro  Summit  leaders  in  particular)  agreed  to  set  up,  under  the  ECB  monitoring,  a  SSM  for  the  main  systemic   banks,   but   authorized   to   intervene   also   on   the   other   banks   should   national  supervisory   authorities   prove   unable   to   exercise   their   role.   The   SSM   entered   into   force   in  November  2013.  Following  that,  in  the  second  part  of  2013  a  discussion  took  place  within  the  European   Council   to   set   up   the   second   pillar   of   a   banking   union,   the   SRM.   This   discussion  arrived   at   a   general   draft   agreement   on   the   SRM   in   the   December   European   Council.  According   to   press   report   No.   564   of   the   Council   (the   institution   that   prepared   the  deliberation  of   the  European  Council)   of   18  December  2013,   the   agreement   consisted  of   “a  draft  regulation  on  the  SRM,  and  a  decision  by  euro-­‐area  member  states  committing  them  to  negotiate,  by  1  March  2014,  an  intergovernmental  agreement  on  the  functioning  of  the  SRM”,  through   the   formation   of   a   Single   Resolution   Fund   (SRF).   The   draft   agreement   included  “arrangement   for   the   transfer   of   national   contributions   to   the   fund   and   their   progressive  mutualisation  over  a  10-­‐year  transitional  period”.  The  draft  regulation  provided  for  a  single  dispute  resolution  board  with  broad  powers   in  cases  of  banking  disputes.  The  board  would  consist  of  an  executive  director,  four  full-­‐time  appointed  members  and  the  representatives  of  the   national   resolution   authorities   of   all   the   participating   countries,   which   are   euro-­‐area  (plus)  member  states.  The  board  can  take  decisions,  unless   the  Council  objects  and  calls   for  change.   In   short,   even   in   the   crucial   financial   sector,   the   regulatory   framework   and   the  
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correspondent  decision-­‐making  bodies  of  the  two  groups  of  member  states  have  come  to  be  organized  by  two  separate  institutional  and  legal  orders.  
  
5.3.  The  implications  on  the  economic  compromise    Also   the   third   compromise   (between   a   centralized   monetary   policy   and   decentralized  economic   policies)   has   not   held   up   in   the   course   of   the   euro   crisis.   Constrained   by   the  intergovernmental   constitution,   the   voluntary   coordination   of   national   policies   has   been  unrelentingly   challenged   by   its   internal   dilemmas.   Voluntary   coordination   has   shown   to   be  incompatible   with   the   respect   of   legal   parameters,   as   required   by   the   ordo-­‐liberal   theory.  Thus,   the  Fiscal  Compact  has  established   (Title  VI,  Art.   14.2)   that,   for   entering   into   force,   it  requires  the  approval  of  12  out  of  the  then  17  euro-­‐area  member  states  (and  out  of  the  then  25  member  states)  signing  it.  Similarly,  the    disciplining  powers  of  third  institutions  (like  the  Commission   and   the   ECJ)   have   been   strengthened.   The   Commission’s   intervention   on   the  contracting  party  disrespecting   the  agreement   is  now  quasi-­‐automatic,   an  automaticity   that  can   be   neutralized   only   by   a   reversed   qualified   majority   of   the   financial   ministers   of   the  signatory   member   states   (Fiscal   Compact,   Art.   17).   The   negative   experience   of   2003   was  acknowledged.   Furthermore   the   Fiscal   Compact   has   required   the   contracting   parties   to  introduce   at   the   constitutional   level   (or   equivalent)   the   balanced-­‐budget   rule,   thus   limiting  also  from  within  the  domestic  system  the  possibilities  for  non-­‐compliance.  The  new  legislative  measures   (European   Semester,   ‘Six   Pack’,   ‘Two   Pack’)   have   increased   both   the   supervisory  role  of  the  Commission  in  monitoring  ex-­ante  member  states’  behavior  regarding  their  respect  of   the   legal  parameters  and  the  sanctioning  role  of   the  Commission   in  activating  ex-­post  the  EDP.  The  new  treaties,  however,  raise  crucial  constitutional  problems.   If  recourse  to  the  ECJ   is  justifiable   by   the   Lisbon   Treaty   itself,   the   same   cannot   be   said   for   the   power   given   to   the  Commission  to  intervene  automatically  with  respect  to  the  non-­‐complaint  contracting  party.  Not   only   is   the   Commission   constituted   of   commissioners   proposed   by  member   states   not  adhering   to   those   treaties   (UK   and   Czech   Republic),   but   above   all   the   Commission   is   an  institution  representing  the  collective  interest  of  a  different  organization.  Moreover,  the  two  treaties   exclude   from   the   policymaking   process   the   EP,   the   institution   that   represents   the  voters  who  will  be  directly  affected  by  the  intergovernmental  decisions.  The  answer  to  those  difficulties  has  been  a  further  judicialization  of  the  governance  of  the  euro-­‐area,  through  the  formalization   of   stricter   macro-­‐economic   and   budgetary   rules   to   be   respected   by   the  signatory   states.  The   financial   aid   to  member   states  unable   to   respect   those   rules  has  been  accompanied  by  conditionality’s  rules  that  have  brought  to  the  downsizing  of  their  decision-­‐making   autonomy.  National   independence  has  been  unevenly   restructured,  with   the  debtor  member  states  become  less  autonomous  than  the  creditor  member  states  for  their  inability  to  control  the  externalities  of  their  policies.    Within   the   European   Council   (and   the   Euro   Summit),   a   decision-­‐making   hierarchy   has  emerged   under   the   form   of   a   German-­‐French   (and   then   only   German)   directorate   of   the  financial   policy   of   the   Union.   With   the   coordination   of   the   Brussels   office   of   European  Council’s  president,   the   financial   strategy   for  dealing  with   the   crisis   came   to  be  dictated  by  Berlin  and  Paris  agreeing  not  only  on   the  strategic  goals  but  also  on   the  policies   to  achieve  them.  The  German-­‐French  directoire,  and   then   the  growing  German  unilateral   leadership  of  the   euro-­‐area,   have   brought   to   an   unprecedented   split   between   Northern   and   Southern  member  states.  If  the  euro  was  adopted  in  the  first  place  for  preserving  a  European  Germany,  the  crisis  of  the  euro  has  brought  to  its  opposite,  that  is  to  the  emergence  of  a  German  Europe.  
13 
 
In  the  effort   to  conciliate  contradictory  principle  of  economic  governance,  namely  voluntary  coordination   and   statutory   definition   of   the   perimeters   of   that   coordination,   the   German  
directoire  has  ended  up  in  imposing  a  convoluted  system  of  rules  aimed  at  preventing  political  discretion   on   the   policies   to   pursue   (in   coherence   with   the   ordo-­‐liberal   theory).   The  assumption   that,   through   the   logic   of   voluntary   policy   coordination,   it   would   have   been  possible   to   govern   the   single   currency   has   been   thus   dramatically   unmasked   by   the   euro  crisis.   The   German   directoire   was   not   properly   congenial   with   “the   spirit   of   solidarity”  celebrated  by  Angela  Merkel  in  her  2  November  2010  speech.    
6.  Institutional  processes  and  legal  configurations    What  is  emerging  from  the  euro  crisis  is  a  Union  different  from  the  one  celebrated  by  and  in   the   Lisbon   Treaty.   New   institutional,   legal   and   ideological   configurations   have   emerged,  although  they  are  far  from  being  consolidated.  First,  it  is  a  EU  characterized  more  and  more  by  the  intergovernmental  logic  (De  Schoutheete  and  Micossi  2013).  It  is  intergovernmental  union,  an  organization  where  the  decision-­‐making  barycenter  is  located  in  the  relations  between  the  European  Council  and  the  Council,  or  better  in  the  relations  between  the  Euro  Summit  and  the  Euro   Group.   This   intergovernmental   union   should   not   be   confused   with   the   economic  community  claimed  or  aimed  by  the  UK  and  the  ex-­‐EFTA  countries.  Not  only  because   it   is  a  political   union   based   on   the   recognition   of   the   need   to   increase   the   Europeanization   of  economic,   fiscal   and   budgetary   policies   (something   ex-­‐EFTA   countries   would   never  recognize),   but   also   because   it   is   a   political   union   controlled   by   the   Brussels’  intergovernmental  institutions  (not  by  each  national  government  deciding  autonomously  the  strategy  to  pursue).  It  is  also  a  political  union  quite  different  from  the  old  supranational  union,  with   the  Commission  as  a   linchpin,  emerged  historically  around   the  common/single  market  policies.    Thus,  contrary  to  the  economic  community’s  perspective,   in  the   intergovernmental  union  the   decision-­‐making   power   resides   in   the   intergovernmental   institutions   of   the   European  Council   (and   Euro   Summit)   and   Council   (and   Euro   Group),   not   in   the   single   national  governments   (cooperating,   more   than   coordinating,   between   them).   At   the   same   time,  contrary  to  the  old  supranationalism,  in  the  intergovernmental  union  emerged  with  the  euro  crisis   the   Commission,   the   ECJ   and   the   EP   play   a   limited   decision-­‐making   role.   The  Commission  and  the  ECJ  are  considered  necessary   instruments   for  guaranteeing  the  respect  of   the   decisions   taken   by   the   intergovernmental   institutions,   but   they   are   no   longer   (the  Commission   in   particular)   the   engine   of   the   policy-­‐making   process.   This   new   institutional  configuration  does  not   imply  the  disappearance  of  the  old  supranationalism  from  the  EU.  In  many  common  market’s  policies,  decisions  are  taken  under  the  impulse  of  the  Commission’s  proposals  and  through  the  co-­‐decisional  legislative  power  of  the  EP  and  the  Council.  However,  the   Union’s   political   processes   are   characterized  more   and  more   by   the   intergovernmental  logic  and  are  dominated  by  the  intergovernmental  institutions.  If  one  accepts  Crum  (2012)’s  assumption,   namely   that   the   EU   by   its   own   nature   may   oscillate   between   the   model   of  ‘parliamentary   federalism’   and   the   model   of   ‘executive   federalism’,   then   it   is   plausible   to  assert  that  the  euro  crisis  has  brought  to  the  affirmation  of  the  latter,  although  in  the  form  of  ‘federalism  of  member  states’  governments’.  One  should  also  consider  whether  this  outcome  has  been  inevitable  given  the  features  of  the  alternative  model  of  ‘parliamentary  federalism’.  The   latter,   which   envisages   a   decision-­‐making   barycenter   structured   around   the   relation  between  the  Commission  and   the  EP,  could  not  be  easily  accepted  by  national  governments  
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representing  states  with  strong  roots  in  their  societies,  cultures  and  histories,  considered  by  their   citizens   a   bulwark   of   democratic   legitimacy.   The   intergovernmental   union   has   thus  appeared  to  be  a  realistic  project  for  dealing  with  the  complexity  of  the  euro-­‐governance  ‘here  and   now’,   whereas   the   parliamentary   union   has   been   at   least   perceived   as   a   long-­‐term  political  project  unconnected  to  the  ‘here  and  now’  issues.  Second,  the  EU  emerging  from  the  euro  crisis  is  centered  more  and  more  around  the  euro-­‐area.   It   is   a   euro   union,  because   the   crucial   decisions   concern   the   viability   of   EMU   and   the  governance   of   the   single   currency.   The   Commission’s   proposal   for   ‘Completing   the   Single  Market’  submitted  on  1  January  2014  (which  follows  Single  Market  Act  I  of  2011  and  Single  Market   Act   II   of   2012)   was   aimed   to   rebalance   the   policy’s   focus   (and   also   the   relation  between  the  Commission  and  the  European  Council).  Nevertheless,  with  the  multiplication  of  treaties,   the  EU  has  gone  beyond   the  paradigm  of  differentiated   integration  within   the   same  
legal  order  that  helped  to  accommodate  the  various  needs  of  its  participants  within  a  unitary  project.  A  new  legal  configuration  has  emerged  from  the  crisis  characterized  by  a  plurality  of  distinct  and  separate  legal  orders.  Internal  differentiation  (to  the  Lisbon  Treaty)  has  become  an  external  differentiation  (to  the  Lisbon  Treaty).  From  the   legal  differentiation  has  derived  also  an  institutional  differentiation,  with  the  formation  of  new  institutional  settings  within  the  Fiscal  Compact  or  the  ESM  or  SRF  that  include  exclusively  euro-­‐area  plus  member  states.  The  euro   crisis   has   been   a   litmus   test   for   the   unitary   paradigm.   From   the   crisis   has   emerged   a  Union   divide   on   its   finalities,   more   than   on   the   different   speeds   in   participating   to   its  institutionalization.   The   formation   of   different   legal   orders   has  manifested   the   existence   of  
more   than   one   union,   rather   than   of  more   than   one   speed,  within   the   EU   (Piris   2012).   In  particular   the   distance   between   the   euro-­‐area   member   states   and   UK   has   grown.   The  preservation   and   then   the   reorganization   of   the   euro-­‐area   has   required   the   adoption   of  measures  at  odds  with  the  interests  of  other  currency  areas  within  the  Union.  Indeed,  it  was  the   British   prime   minister   to   recognize   this   distance,   probably   more   than   many   prime  ministers   of   the   euro-­‐area  member   states.   On   23   January   2013,   David   Cameron   said:   “The  European  Treaty   commits   the  member   states   to   lay   the   foundation   of   an   ever   closer   union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe  (…).  We  understand  and  respect  the  rights  of  others  to  maintain  their   commitment   to   this   goal.   But   for   Britain   –   and   perhaps   for   others   –   it   is   not   the  objective”.  This  structural  separation  of   interests  between  the  euro-­‐area  member  states  and  the   member   states   not   adopting   the   single   currency   has   raised   the   challenge   of   how   to  accommodate  those  different  areas  of  member  states  in  a  common  market4.    Third,   the   EU   emerging   from   the   euro   crisis   is   a   de-­politicized   union.   Its   operation   are  constrained  by  rules  (more  than  laws)  guarded  by  non-­‐political  bodies  (from  the  Commission  to   the   panoply   of   specialized   committees   and   boards   and   agencies).   It   is   a   judicialized   and  
technocratic   union.   In   order   to   deal   with   the   dilemmas   of   collective   action   in   an  intergovernmental-­‐euro  union,  it  has  been  dramatically  increased  the  number  of  ex  ante  and  
ex  post  measures  of  control  on  domestic  budgetary  and  fiscal  policies.  These  measures  have  been   decided   by   the   national   heads   of   state   and   government   meeting   in   the  intergovernmental  institutions,  in  the  absence  of  any  significant  political  control  from  the  EP.  
                                                
4 In a speech given to the Nordic-Baltic Ambassadors, Lord Owen (2011) proposed to set up a Non Euro Group (NEG) 
whose (11) members, chaired by the president of the European Council, “would be able to adjust their currency 
exchanges rates…to establish their own corporation tax levels, their own fiscal regimes and their own monetary policy 
governed by their own central bank”. This would reflect “an existing reality that there are at present two groupings in 
relation to currency management within the EU – an informal Euro Group and informal Non Euro Group. (…) The EU 
is a mixture of the intergovernmental and the supranational. The mix will probably evolve in both directions…”. See 
also House of Lords (2014). 
15 
 
However,   in  order   to  promote   the  compliance  with   those  measures,   in  a  policy’s  model  still  based   on   voluntary   coordination,   the   national   governments,   under   the   German   leadership,  have  transformed  the  policy-­‐making  process   in  a   judicial  and  technocratic  process,  with  the  Commission   and   the   ECJ   asked   to   play   the   watchdog’s   role.   The   net   result   of   this  transformation   has   been   an   unprecedented   intrusive   intervention   in   the   debtor   euro   area  member  states  by  non-­‐political   institutions,  on  behalf  of   the   intergovernmental   institutions,  under   the   direction   of   the   creditor   euro-­‐area   member   states,   Germany   in   primis.   Such  technocratic  and   judicial   intrusion   in   the  budgetary  and   fiscal  policies  of   the  member  states  seem   paradoxical.   In   fact,   no   other   proper   federal   unions   could   have   ever   accepted   such   a  degree  of  decision-­‐making  intrusion  of  the  federal  centre  on  the  federated  states  (Fabbrini  F.  2013).  However,  once  the  model  pursued  is  that  of  the  ‘federalism  of  governments’,  then  it  is  not   unsurprising   that   governments   of   the   stronger  member   states   have   ended   up   in   being  much   more   influential   than   the   governments   of   the   weaker   ones.   Under   the   ideological  predominance   of   ordo-­‐liberal   paradigm,   the   euro-­‐area   has   been   Germanized:   a   positive  outcome   with   regard   to   the   imposition   of   a   responsible   approach   to   the   management   of  domestic   fiscal   resources,  much   less   positive  with   regard   to   the   functioning   of   the   EMU   at  large.   In   short,   the   ordo-­‐liberal   paradigm   has   tended   to   substitute   politics   with   rules  (Habermas   2012).   The   necessary   work   of   Union’s   politicians   in   mediating   between   the  different  interests  of  the  member  states,  an  activity  that  would  have  required  the  control  of  an  autonomous  fiscal  capacity  by  the  Union’s  institutions  (Maduro  2012),  has  been  downsized  in  favour  of  an  approach  that  circumscribes  political  discretion  with  a  long  list  of  detailed  rules  prescribing  specific  behaviour  by  the  member  states’  politicians.  Thus  a  set  of  economic  and  political   ideas   emerged   in   Germany   in   the   1930s   has   become   the   core   of   the   ideological  configuration   characterizing   the   2010s   EMU.   At   their   turn,   the   success   of   the   ordo-­‐liberal  paradigm  has  created  the  normative  framework  for  justifying  and  supporting  the  ascendancy  of  German  hegemony  within  the  EU  at  large.    
7.  Conclusion    The   paper   has   argued   that   the   euro   crisis   has   called   into   question   the   multiple  compromises   celebrated   by   the   Lisbon   Treaty,   compromises   pursued   for   preserving   the  unitary  legal  and  institutional  nature  of  the  integration  process.  The  euro  crisis  has  upset  the  balance   between   the   old   supranationalism   and   the   new   intergovernmentalism.   The   unitary  legal   order   that   accommodated   the   euro-­‐area   and   opt-­‐out   member   states   has   been  fragmented   by   the   approval   of   new   intergovernmental   treaties   with   their   own   specific  institutional   settings.   The   attempt   to   conciliate   national   discretion   in   economic   policy   and  supranational   non-­‐discretionary   monetary   policy   has   failed   either   under   the   challenges   of  collective   action’s   dilemmas   in   condition   of   crisis.   The   weakening   of   the   Lisbon   Treaty’s  compromises   has   brought   to   new   institutional,   legal   and   ideological   configurations.   These  configurations  are  far  from  being  consolidated.  They  have  come  to  intertwine  with  previously  established  institutional  and  legal  orders,  creating  a  highly  complex  and  contradictory  system  of   relations   within   and   outside   the   EU.   It   is   an   open   question   how   to   escape   from   this  constitutional  conundrum.  Probably,   it   requires   the  surrender  of   the  unitary  and  expanding  project  of  integration,  without  sacrificing  its  main  achievement,  i.e.  the  single  market.          
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